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Abstract— Low-level criminals, who do the legwork in a criminal 
organization are the most likely to be arrested, whereas the high-level 
ones tend to avoid attention. But crippling the work of a criminal 
organizations is not possible unless investigators can identify the most 
influential, high-level members and monitor their communication 
channels. Investigators often approach this task by requesting the 
mobile phone service records of the arrested low-level criminals to 
identify contacts, and then they build a network model of the 
organization where each node denotes a criminal and the edges 
represent communications. Network analysis can be used to infer the 
most influential criminals and most important communication 
channels within the network but screening all the nodes and links in a 
network is laborious and time consuming. Here we propose a new 
forensic analysis system called IICCC (Identifying Influential 
Criminals and their Communication Channels) that can effectively 
and efficiently infer the high-level criminals and short-list the 
important communication channels in a criminal organization, based 
on the mobile phone communications of its members. IICCC can also 
be used to build a network from crime incident reports. We evaluated 
IICCC experimentally and compared it with five other systems, 
confirming its superior prediction performance. 
   Index Terms— Forensic investigation tool, criminal network, mobile 
communications data, influential criminals, low-level criminals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sanctioning and removing the leaders of a criminal organization 
can lead to a significant reduction in the organization’s criminal 
activities [11, 32]. These criminals play crucial and decisive roles 
in controlling the flow of information within the organization. 
Digital forensics tools are widely used by criminal investigators to 
identify the leaders of criminal organizations. Some of these tools 
are inspired by social network analysis (SNA) [39] and others 
employ the k-clique technique [21, 41, 45]. For example, the k-
clique technique was used to identify a group of hackers called 
Shadowcrew [29], and to identify a community of criminals from 
a large dataset of Canadian offenders [16]. 
           Hierarchically structured criminal organizations mainly use 
mobile phones and emails to communicate, so access to mobile 
communications data (MCD) and email records allows the 
relationships among the members of such organizations to be 
depicted as networks, often allowing the identification of leaders 
and the most important communication channels [16, 18, 22, 28, 
29, 30, 41, 45]. For example, the email addresses of Nigeria-based 
scammers were linked to their Facebook profiles and the k-clique 
was used to identify the scammers and their leaders, based on a 
social network with 40,000 nodes [18]. More recently, crime 







to depict the relationships among its members [8]. Most current 
approaches compute the relative importance of each node in a 
criminal network to infer the primary nodes representing the 
leaders, a strategy known as the relative importance problem [19]. 
These approaches are usually inspired by the k-clique technique 
[18, 20, 29, 48], network metrics [26], and semantic similarities [3, 
25, 44]. However, such strategies generally cannot short-list the 
important communication channels in a network and the channels 
need to be investigated directly to provide insight into the criminal 
organization and its influential members. There are numerous 
communication channels in criminal networks, and investigating 
all the channels is time-consuming and distracting, when the 
investigators would prefer to focus on the key channels that reveal 
the most information.            
          In order to address this challenge, we have developed the 
IICCC system (Identifying Influential Criminals and their 
Communication Channels) which exploits the hierarchical 
structure of typical criminal organizations to infer not only the 
high-ranking members but also the vital communication channels, 
based on the propagation of information among nodes. The key 
contribution of this paper lies in identifying the vital 
communication channels in a criminal network. These vital 
channels involve a sequence of nodes that form part of one or more 
communication paths and depict influential criminals, who 
propagate important information diffused by a top-ranking 
member. These communication channels are likely to hold vital 
information about the criminal organization [49]. The ultimate goal 
of our proposed system IICCC is to identify these important 
communication channels. Since the information propagated 
through these channels originate from influential members in an 
organization, we also describe a methodology in the paper for 
identifying these influential members. 
        The authors of [23] observed that the change in the flow rate 
of information diffused by higher-level criminals is slower than 
that of lower-level criminals. This has led us to hypothesize that 
the steadiness of information flow rate increases as the chain of 
command gets higher. That is, we hypothesize that influential 
leaders diffuse information in more steady rate than less influential 
ones. IICCC identifies the top leaders of a criminal organization 
based on the above-mentioned hypothesis by computing the chi-
squared (χ2) values [17, 34] of the network’s nodes. Criminals 
represented by nodes with high χ2 are considered top leaders. 
Finally, IICCC identifies the important communication channels 
originating from these top leaders. These channels are likely to hold 
vital information about the criminal organization. An important 
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communication channel is a sequence of influential criminals who 
propagate information diffused by a top leader. In the framework 
of IICCC, these important channels are identified by computing the 
χ2 values of the communication channels connecting each two 
adjacent nodes that are part of a communication path originating 
from a top leader. The channels with large χ2 values are considered 
critical communication channels.         
II. MOTIVATION AND OUTLINE OF THE APPROACH 
Low-level criminals who do the leg work are usually the easier to 
be caught and taken into custody. Criminal investigators, usually, 
take advantage of these detained criminals as a bridge for 
identifying their top leaders [1, 55]. To do so, the investigators 
would ask mobile service providers for the MCD that belongs to 
these arrested low-level criminals, their callers, the callers of their 
callers, and so on. Then, they would build a communication 
network depicting the criminal organization. This is an effective 
approach, because the vast majority of criminal organizations, 
nowadays, contemplate their plots using mobile phones [21]. Many 
techniques have been proposed in literature for identifying the 
relative importance of nodes in such networks [18, 25, 29, 48]. 
However, most of these techniques may not work well for short-
listing the critical communication channels, which provide insight 
into criminal organizations and their influential members. This is 
because these techniques have been designed to identify the 
influential nodes in a network and not the critical communication 
channels that pass high and steady rate of information diffused by 
these influential nodes. We introduce in this paper the forensic 
system IICCC, which can infer the high-level criminals and short-
list the important communication channels in a criminal 
organization, based on the mobile phone communications of its 
members. 
        Identifying high-level criminals and short-listing the 
important communication channels originating from them can help 
investigators monitor the criminal organization. This monitoring 
can give an insight into the organization’s work and the identity of 
a large number of the insiders and outsiders who deal with it. This 
will eventually lead to the arrest of these people, which will most 
likely result in at least crippling the organization’s work. Thus, for 
the monitoring procedure to be effective, the influential members 
of a criminal organization should be identified. Sanctioning and 
removing (e.g., arresting) these influential leaders can lead to 
significant reduction in the organization’s criminal activities [11, 
32]. 
         We use the term “significant communication path” to denote a 
sequence of nodes in a criminal network representing influential 
criminals who propagate information diffused by a top-ranked 
leader in the criminal organization. We use the term “critical 
communication channel” to denote a portion of a “significant 
communication path” that has a high and steady rate of information 
flow relative to the other paths in the network. 
       Let p be a “significant communication path” originating from a 
top-ranked leader r in a criminal organization. A “critical 
communication channel” denotes a sub-path  p that has a high 
and steady flow rate of information diffused by r and propagated 
by influential criminals to lower-level criminals. Some of this 
information may be passed to  via other significant 
communication paths originating from r.  
          A “critical communication channel” is likely to hold vital 
information about a criminal organization. The ultimate goal of 
IICCC is to identify the “critical communication channels” in a 
network. To identify the “critical communication channels”, IICCC 
identifies the influential nodes representing the top-ranked 
members as a precursor. To identify the top-ranked members, 
IICCC identifies the “significant communication paths” as a 
precursor.  
         IICCC infers the high-level criminals and the critical 
communication channels in a criminal organization by going 
through the following sequence of steps: 
1) Construct a network based on either MCD or crime 
incident reports pertaining to the organization. Section III 
describes this process in detail. 
2) Identify the significant communication paths originating 
from each node in the network. Subsection IV describes 
this process in detail. 
3) Compute the χ2 value of each node in a significant 
communication path, based on the actual (observed) and 
expected betweenness centralities of the nodes. 
Subsection V-A describes this process in detail. 
4) Identify the influential criminals by ranking the nodes 
based on their χ2 values. Subsection V-B describes this 
process in detail. 
5) Identify the critical communication channels in the 
network by: (1) computing the actual (observed) 
betweenness centralities, expected betweenness 
centralities, and χ2 values of the communication channels 
(edges) connecting each two adjacent nodes  and  
that are part of a significant communication path 
originating from an influential node in the network; 
(2) computing the summation of the χ2 values of the 
communication channels, which are part of the different 
significant communication paths that pass through  and 
; and (3) identifying the channels with large χ2 values, 
which will be considered the critical communication 
channels. Subsection VI describes this process in detail. 
Fig. 1 shows a process legend that visualizes the sequential 
processing steps taken by IICCC to identify influential leaders and 
“critical communication channels”. 
 
Fig. 1: A process legend that visualizes the sequential processing steps taken by 






III. COMPUTING NODE BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY  
IICCC can construct networks from either MCD or crime incident 
reports. In a MCD network, a node denotes a caller/receiver 
criminal and an edge denotes the flow of information (phone calls, 
text messages or emails) between two criminals. IICCC adopts the 
space approach concept [7] to automatically build a network from 
crime incident reports [8]. We assume that criminals who appear in 
the same crime incident reports collaborate in committing crimes. 
Let e be an edge linking two nodes n1 and n2 in a network built from 
crime incident reports. Then e denotes the co-occurrence of two 
criminals represented by n1 and n2 in the same crime incident 
reports. 
         Node betweenness has been used extensively to indicate the 
centralities of nodes in a network [45]. A node with a relatively 
large betweenness centrality acts as a bridge that controls the flow 
of information between the nodes of the network. Thus, the 
betweenness centralities of nodes are reflective of the relative 
influences of these nodes in the network. IICCC therefore 
computes the betweenness centralities of all nodes in a network to 
capture their relative influence over the information flow in the 
network. 
        Several variations that capture the notion of node betweenness 
have been proposed. In one widely adopted measure [14], the 
betweenness B(v) of a node v is the fraction of the number of 
shortest paths from all nodes to all other nodes that pass-through v, 
as defined in Equation 1:  
                                                                  (1) 
where  is the number of shortest paths from node  to 
node  that passes through , and  is the overall number of 
shortest paths from node to node . 
         Calculating the betweenness centralities of nodes in a 
network that has n nodes and k links (edges) using a breadth-first 
search (BFS) algorithm takes O(kn2) [42]. This is because, 
computing the shortest path between two nodes takes O(k) and 
there are O(n2) pairs of nodes. A faster algorithm that calculates the 
betweenness centrality is based on the dependency accumulation 
technique [47]. Nodes are accessed in the reverse order compared 
to BFS. The algorithm takes O(kn) on an unweighted network, 
where k is the number of links. In the framework of IICCC, we use 
this technique to compute node betweenness, as defined in 
Equation 2: 
 
                                                                     (2)   
where B(v) is the betweenness of a node v, and is the 
dependency of a node s on node v, as defined in Equation 3. 
                                            (3) 
where Ps(w) is the set of predecessors of a node w located on the 
shortest paths from node s, and is the overall number of 
shortest paths from node to node . 
To illustrate the concepts proposed in this paper, we use a running 
example based on the network shown in Fig. 2. The network 
depicts communication attempts within a criminal organization 
based on its MCD, where a node denotes a criminal and an edge 
denotes the flow of information (phone calls and text messages) 
between two criminals. The network consists of 45 nodes and 103 
edges (communication channels). 
         Example 1: Table 1 shows the betweenness centralities of the 
45 nodes in the running network presented in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 2: A network depicting the communication attempts within a criminal 
organization based on its MCD. The network contains 45 nodes representing 45 
criminals in the organization. The network contains 103 edges representing 103 
communication channels among the 45 criminals.  
Table 1: The betweenness centrality of each of the 45 nodes in our running network 
presented in Fig. 2. 
 
IV. IDENTIFYING THE SIGNIFICANT COMMUNICATION PATHS 
ORIGINATING FROM EACH NODE IN A NETWORK 
IICCC identifies the significant communication paths originating 
from a node n as follows. Let S be the set of nodes that are directly 
connected to n by edges. For each node m in S, IICCC determines 
the significant communication path p originating from n and 
passing through m as follows. Let  be a node at hierarchical level 
l in p. Let be the set of nodes at hierarchical level (l +1) that are 
directly connected to by edges. From among the nodes in , 
IICCC selects the node that has the highest betweenness 
centrality. Thus, becomes part of the path p. This process 
continues until the path p starts to converge to itself. That is, path 
p starts from n and ends at , which is the node in the path where 
the path starts to converge to itself. 
        Example 2: Let us identify the significant communication 
paths originating from node 6 in our running network shown in Fig. 
2. The set of nodes that is directly connected to node 6 by edges is 
{5, 9, 13, 10, 3} indicating five significant communication paths. 
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For easy reference, we refer to these paths using the following 
notations: 6à5, 6à9, 6à13, 6à10 and 6à3. Fig. 3 shows these 
five channels. For example, path 6à13 is identified as follows:  
• The set of nodes directly connected to node 13 by edges is 
{9, 5, 12, 17, 18, 19}. Node 18 has the largest betweenness 
centrality among the nodes in this set (Table 1).  
• At level 2 of channel 6à13, the information therefore 
passes through node 18. The set of nodes directly connected 
to node 18 by edges is {21, 28, 22, 23, 14}. Node 21 has the 
largest betweenness centrality among the nodes in this set 
(Table 1).  
• At level 3 of channel 6à13, the information therefore 
passes through node 21.  
• Ultimately, the sequence (6à13à18à21à27à34à28à27) 
starts to converge to itself at node 27. This happens because 
(1) the information passes through node 28 at level 6; (2) 
node 27 has the largest betweenness centrality among the 
nodes that are directly connected to node 28; and (3) the 
information has already passed through node 27 at level 4. 
 
 
Fig. 3: The five significant communication paths originating from node 6 in our 
running example network. Each path is assigned a different color. 
V. IDENTIFYING THE INFLUENTIAL CRIMINALS IN THE NETWORK 
Arresting the influential leaders of a criminal organization can lead 
to the reduction of the rate of information flow, which in turn 
destabilizes the criminal network [36]. The information diffused by 
these leaders is propagated by criminals in the chain of command 
[37]. As [35] indicates, the directives from the leaders of a criminal 
organization are transmitted from higher-level criminals to lower-
level criminals in the chain of hierarchy. The authors of [23] 
observed that the change in the rate of information flow decreases 
as the number of the receivers of this information increases. As a 
result, these authors assume that the change in the flow rate of 
information diffused by higher-level criminals is slower than that 
of lower-level criminals. This finding conforms to several studies, 
which observed that as the influence of a criminal gets higher, the 
centrality score of the node representing this criminal increases 
[36] (i.e., a higher score of a node could be an indicative of a larger 
number of receivers of the information diffused by this node). All 
the above revelations have led us to hypothesize that the steadiness 
of information flow rate increases as the chain of command gets 
higher. That is, we hypothesize that influential leaders diffuse 
information in more steady rate than less influential ones.  
        IICCC identifies the top leaders of a criminal organization 
based on the above-mentioned hypothesis. More specifically, if the 
difference between the actual and expected betweenness 
centralities of the nodes located in the significant communication 
paths originating from a node n is small, IICCC considers n as 
influential. To achieve this, IICCC uses χ2 analysis [17, 34] to 
compute the goodness of fit of the observed and expected 
betweenness centralities of the nodes in a significant 
communication path. This is because χ2 analysis can effectively 
determine whether an observed distribution conforms to any 
particular expected distribution. IICCC considers criminals 
represented by nodes with large χ2 values as influential. 
A. Computing the χ2 Value of a Node 
In IICCC, the degree of influence of a node n is represented by its 
χ2 value [17, 34]. The degree of influence of n is the summed 
degrees of influence of the nodes in the significant communication 
paths originating from n. Thus, the χ2 value of n is the overall χ2 
value of the nodes in the significant communication paths 
originating from n. That is, the χ2 value of n is the summation of 
the χ2 values of the paths originating from n. The χ2 value of each 
of these paths is the summation of the χ2 values of the nodes in the 
path. The χ2 value of each of these nodes is determined as follows. 
Let p be a significant communication path originating from n. Let 
m be a node located at hierarchical level l of p. The χ2 value of m is 
determined based on the betweenness centralities of (1) the nodes 
in p; and (2) the nodes at level l of the other paths originating from 
n, as defined in Equation 4 [17, 34]: 
 
                                                                   χ2 = (O−E)2/E            (4) 
 
where O is the observed betweenness centrality of the node, and E 
is the expected betweenness centrality of the node. 
        The Expected betweenness centrality ( ) of a node n located 
at level l of a path p is computed using Equation 5: 
                                                                     (5) 
where is the betweenness centrality of path p originating from 
node n;  is the summation of the betweenness centralities of the 
nodes at level l of the paths originating from n; and  is the 
summation of the betweenness centralities of the paths originating 
from n. 
 
        Let pu and pv be two significant communication paths 
originating from a node n under consideration. Let pu contain u 
levels and pv contain v levels. Let pu be the longest significant 
communication path originating from n. Thus, v < u. IICCC would 
assign a zero observed betweenness centrality (O) for each 
hypothetical node located at levels v +1, v +2, …., u. 
       Example 3: Let us compute the χ2 value for node 6 in our 
running network as shown in Fig. 3. The left-hand portion of Table 
2 shows the observed betweenness centralities (O) of the nodes 
comprising the five significant communication paths originating 















longest path and contains nine levels. Given that each of the paths 
6à5, 6à9 and 6à10 contains only eight levels, the hypothetical 
nodes at level 9 of these three paths are assigned zero observed 
betweenness centralities (Table 2). Because path 6à13 contains 
only seven levels, the hypothetical nodes at levels 8 and 9 of this 
path are assigned zero observed betweenness centralities (Table 2). 
The middle portion of Table 2 shows the expected betweenness 
centralities (E) of the nodes comprising the five paths. For 
example, the expected betweenness centrality of node 5 at level 1 
of path 6à5 is calculated as follows: . The 
right-hand portion of Table 2 shows the χ2 values of the nodes 
comprising the five paths, the summed χ2 values of the five paths 
(bottom row), and the χ2 value of node 6 (the bottom right-hand 
corner). For example, the χ2 value of node 5 at level 1 of path 6à5 
is calculated as follows: . The χ2 value of 
a path is the summation of the χ2 values of the nodes comprising it. 
For example, the χ2 value of path 6à5 is 0.227 (Table 2). The χ2 
value of a node from which significant communication paths 
originate is the summation of the χ2 values of these paths. For 
example, the χ2 value of node 6 is the summation of the χ2 values 
of the five paths (3.323; bottom right-hand corner of Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Observed betweenness centralities, expected betweenness centralities, and 
χ2 values of the nodes comprising the significant communication paths originating 
from node 6 as well as the overall χ2 value of node 6 in our running network as 
described in Example 3. 
 
B. Identifying the Influential Criminals 
Nowadays, criminal organizations can be classified as either 
hierarchically well-structured [27] or hierarchically loosely 
structured [52]. Usually, a hierarchically well-structured 
organization operates under the directions of leaders of varying 
degrees of influences [27]. Hierarchically loosely structured 
organizations are usually composed of loosely connected groups of 
criminals [52]. Each group includes some influential criminals, 
who provide some type of directions to the group. The framework 
of IICCC can be applied to both, the hierarchically well-structured 
and loosely structured organizations, as long as their 
communication networks can be depicted. IICCC can help 
investigators to identify the influential criminals in these 
organizations by generating short-lists comprising small and 
tightly-defined groups of their most influential individuals. It does 
so by ranking the nodes in a criminal network based on their χ2 
values (Subsection V-A). Criminals represented by the top-ranked 
nodes are considered by IICCC as the most influential ones in the 
organization.  
       Example 4: Table 3 ranks the nodes in our running network 
based on their χ2 values, which are calculated using the techniques 
described in Subsection V-A and Example 3. Investigators should 
focus on the top-ranked nodes, especially node 6. 
 
Table 3: The nodes in our running network ranked based on their χ2 values. 
Rank Node Ch. Sq. Rank Node Ch. Sq. Rank Node Ch. Sq. 
1 6 3.323 16 32 2.037 31 11 1.236 
2 34 2.916 17 35 1.909 32 17 1.216 
3 29 2.908 18 37 1.897 33 44 1.145 
4 3 2.894 19 14 1.831 34 33 1.123 
5 38 2.822 20 20 1.803 35 8 1.1 
6 21 2.815 21 15 1.772 36 41 0.926 
7 12 2.753 22 4 1.699 37 9 0.921 
8 43 2.677 23 19 1.688 38 28 0.858 
9 13 2.562 24 16 1.678 39 23 0.852 
10 18 2.523 25 30 1.527 40 40 0.848 
11 22 2.401 26 25 1.431 41 7 0.592 
12 39 2.274 27 31 1.344 42 2 0.568 
13 36 2.261 28 26 1.289 43 1 0.38 
14 27 2.136 29 5 1.25 44 42 0.363 
15 10 2.113 30 11 1.236 45 45 0.254 
VI. IDENTIFYING THE CRITICAL COMMUNICATION CHANNELS 
Each member of a criminal organization O is controlled either 
directly or indirectly by a core influential criminal(s) i. The 
information diffused by i is propagated to the members of O 
through communication channels. The order in which the criminals 
receive and propagate the information within these channels 
corresponds to their hierarchical influence in O [27]. Therefore, the 
portions of these channels that involve influential members of O 
are likely to hold vital information about O, hence their designation 
as critical communication channels. In IICCC, a critical 
communication channel is a sequence of influential criminals who 
form part of one or more significant communication paths that pass 
information diffused by a top-ranking member. In other words, let 
p be a significant communication path originating from a top 
influential criminal i. A critical communication channel is a sub-
path (channel)  p that encompasses a sequence of influential 
criminals, who propagate information through either (1) p alone, or 
(2) p and other significant communication paths originating from i. 
Based on the betweenness centralities of the edges in a network 
[15], IICCC calculates the expected betweenness centralities and 
χ2 values of the communication channels connecting each two 
adjacent nodes  and  that are part of a significant 
communication path  originating from the node under 
consideration. Then IICCC computes the summation of the χ2 
values of the communication channels that are part of the different 
significant communication paths that pass through  and . For 
example, if there are k significant communication paths that pass 
through  and , we sum the χ2 values of the channels of these 
paths between  and . That is, we sum the χ2 values of the 
portion of these paths (channels) at their hierarchical levels 
between  and . This summation is considered the χ2 value of 
the communication channel connecting  and . The channels 















          Example 5: Let us identify the critical communication 
channels originating from the most core influential node in our 
running network, which is node 6 (Table 3). Based on the 
betweenness centralities of the edges in the network [15] (the 
observed betweenness centralities of the edges), we calculate the 
expected betweenness centralities and χ2 values of the 
communication channels connecting each two adjacent nodes that 
are part of the significant communication paths originating from 
node 6. As shown in Table 4, the χ2 value of each communication 
channel connecting each two adjacent nodes  and that are 
part of a significant communication path p is  computed based on 
the hierarchical level of  and within p. For example, the 
communication channel at level 3 of path 6à5 (i.e., the portion of 
the path between nodes 13 and 18) has an observed betweenness 
centrality of 364.1, an expected betweenness centrality of 250.1, 
and a χ2 value of 52. The overall χ2 value of a communication 
channel connecting two adjacent nodes  and is the 
summation of the χ2 values of the communication channels 
connecting  and  that are part of the significant 
communication paths passing through  and . Fig. 4 shows the 
overall χ2 value of each communication channel. For example, 
Table 5 shows the overall χ2 value of the communication channel 
connecting nodes 13 and 18, which is computed as follows. As Fig. 
3 shows, paths 6à5, 6à9, 6à13, and 6à3 pass through nodes 13 
and 18 at different hierarchical levels: paths 6à5 and 6à9 pass 
through the two nodes at the third hierarchical level, path 6à13 
passes through the two nodes at the second hierarchical level, and 
path 6à3 passes through the two nodes at the fourth hierarchical 
level. Therefore, the χ2 values of the different communication 
channels connecting nodes 13 and 18 are computed based on the 
above hierarchical levels. Table 5 shows the corresponding 
hierarchical levels and χ2 values. Accordingly, the overall χ2 value 
of the channel connecting nodes 13 and 18 is 525.2, which was 
computed by summing the χ2 values of the different channels. The 
critical communication channels are therefore those connecting the 
following nodes: (6, 13), (13, 18), and (18, 21). Although Fig. 4 
shows there are 103 edges (communication channels) in the 
network, IICCC was able to short-list three critical communication 
channels allowing investigators to focus on these as key targets. 
Table 4: Observed betweenness centralities, expected betweenness centralities, and 
χ2 values of each communication channel connecting each two adjacent nodes  
and that are part of a significant communication path p originating from node 6 
in our running network. The values were computed based on the hierarchical level 
of  and within p. 
 
 
Fig. 4: The overall χ2 value of each communication channel connecting each two 
adjacent nodes that are part of a significant communication path originating from 
node 6 (the most influential node) in our running network. The critical 
communication channels originating from node 6 are marked with thick solid 
arrows and the rest are marked with thick dotted arrows. The χ2 values of each 
communication channel originating from node 6 are also shown. 
 
 
Table 5: The overall χ2 value of the communication channel connecting nodes 13 
and 18 computed by summing the χ2 values of the different channels connecting 
these two nodes based on the hierarchical level of the two nodes. 
Path Hierarchical level of path between nodes 13 and 18 χ2 value 
Path 6 à5 3 52 
Path 6 à 9 3 86.6 
Path 6à13 2 302.7 
Path 6à 3 4 83.9 
∑ (overall χ2 value of channel 13-18) 525.2 
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We implemented IICCC in Java and ran it on a computer featuring 
an Intel Core i7 processor (2.70 GHz) and 16 GB of RAM running 
Windows 10 Pro. We compared IICCC experimentally with five 
competing systems: Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [40], 
SIIMCO [45], ECLfinder [41], CrimeNet Explorer [21], and 
LogAnalysis [13]. Each of these systems is briefly described 
below. 
        LSH [40] employs locality sensitive hashing techniques for 
identifying the important edges in a network. [40] used this 
technique for identifying energy-efficient paths. It applied energy-
efficient for low importance edges and full fidelity for high 
importance edges. SIIMCO [45] and ECLfinder [41] are systems 
that we previously proposed as tools to identify the leaders of a 
criminal organization based on MCD. The key difference between 
IICCC and these systems is that IICCC adopts the significant 
communication path and critical communication channel concepts, 
whereas ECLfinder applies the existence dependency concept, and 









reflecting its relative importance in the network. CrimeNet 
Explorer [21] uses Blockmodeling [5] and the shortest path 
algorithm to compute the relationships between nodes. It uses the 
closeness, degree and betweenness centrality metrics to identify the 
leaders of a criminal organization represented by a MCD network. 
Finally, LogAnalysis [13] computes the edge betweenness for a 
network using the Girvan & Newman algorithm [15], and then uses 
the greedy algorithm [33] to cluster the network hierarchically. The 
top clusters confine the important nodes in the network. 
A. Compiling Datasets for Evaluation 
The algorithms were evaluated using three real-world 
communications datasets, namely the Caviar dataset [6, 31], the 
Enron email dataset [12], and the Krebs’s 9/11 dataset [50, 51]. We 
converted each dataset to a network depicting the communication 
attempts between the individuals incriminated in the incidents. 
Each dataset is briefly described below. 
• Caviar dataset [6, 31] is drug-trafficking operation’s 
communications among a Canadian gang called Caviar. The 
Caviar gang operated in Montreal, Canada, and dealt with 
importing and distributing hashish and cocaine. A network was 
created based on the phone calls among the drug traffickers 
between the years 1994 and 1996. The network consists of 110 
nodes representing 110 gang members. Since the identities of the 
gang members have been kept confidential, the members are 
represented in the network by node designations (e.g., N1, N2, 
….). The dataset is available at [9]. 
• Enron email dataset [12, 24] is a corpus of email messages 
exchanged between top Enron employees and associates. The 
corpus came to light in 2001 following a criminal investigation 
about alleged white-collar crime within the Enron Corporation. 
Most of these emails revolve around this. The dataset consists of 
619,446 messages exchanged between 158 Enron employees. 
After cleaning the data, we obtained 200,136 messages 
exchanged between 151 employees. The investigation of Enron 
wrongdoing incriminated 28 Enron employees and associates. 
The names and identities of these 28 employees have been 
released to the public. In our evaluations, we considered the 
identities of these 28 employees as ground-truth data. The raw 
corpus is currently available online at [12]. 
 
• Krebs’s 9/11 dataset [50, 51] is a corpus depicting the interactions 
between the terrorists involved in the 9/11 incident. The 9/11 
were a series of four coordinated terrorist attacks on the United 
States on the morning of September 11, 2001. The Krebs’s 9/11 
dataset includes a network depicting interactions between the 
individuals incriminated in the terrorist attacks. The network 
contains 62 nodes depicting the terrorists implicated in the plot. 
It contains 153 links (edges) depicting the interactions between 
the terrorists. The average degree of a node is 4.9. We considered 
the lists of the terrorists ranked by Krebs [50] based on the 
Degree, Betweenness, and Closeness centralities of the nodes 
representing them in the network as a ground-truth dataset. 
B. Evaluating the Accuracy of Detecting Influential Nodes  
We compared the influential nodes returned by each system with 
the corresponding ones returned by the standard Betweenness, 
Closeness, Out Degree, and In Degree centrality metrics [4, 54]. 
We compared the results in terms of the following standard quality 
metrics: 
,        ,         
where is the number of correct nodes predicted by a system, 
is the actual number of correct nodes, and  is the number 
of nodes predicted by a system. Let Ltop and Ls be the lists predicted 
by a network metric and a system, respectively, ranked based on 
their influences.   Ltop and  = | Ltop |.  
         Accordingly, we computed the Recalls, Precisions, and F-
values of each system with regards to each network centrality 
metric and each quality metric. Table 6 shows the results using the 
Caviar dataset [6, 31], Table 7 shows the results using the Enron 
email dataset [12], and Table 8 shows the results using Krebs’s 
9/11 dataset [50, 51]. Fig. 5 shows the overall average Recalls, 
Precisions, and F-values of the five systems. 
 
Table 6: The quality of the results predicted by each system computed by comparing 
the system’s top-ranked nodes with the corresponding ones predicted by the 
network metrics using the Caviar dataset [50, 51]. 













0.62 0.66 0.64 
ECLfinder 0.56 0.55 0.55 
SIIMCO 0.57 0.60 0.58 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.55 0.52 0.53 












0.64 0.53 0.58 
ECLfinder 0.46 0.41 0.43 
SIIMCO 0.59 0.47 0.52 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.52 0.40 0.45 












y 0.68 0.74 0.76 
ECLfinder 0.66 0.71 0.67 
SIIMCO 0.68 0.62 0.65 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.55 0.51 0.53 














0.73 0.69 0.71 
ECLfinder 0.68 0.63 0.65 
SIIMCO 0.62 0.57 0.59 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.54 0.47 0.50 
LogAnalysis 0.54 0.51 0.52 
 
Table 7: The quality of the results predicted by each system computed by comparing 
the system’s top-ranked nodes with the corresponding ones predicted by the 
network metrics using the Enron dataset [12]. 













0.57 0.54 0.55 
ECLfinder 0.58 0.50 0.54 
SIIMCO 0.52 0.46 0.49 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.37 0.30 0.33 












0.55 0.48 0.51 
ECLfinder 0.44 0.37 0.40 
SIIMCO 0.46 0.39 0.42 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.34 0.26 0.29 












y 0.72 0.67 0.69 
ECLfinder 0.69 0.67 0.68 
SIIMCO 0.64 0.61 0.62 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.40 0.34 0.37 














0.69 0.73 0.71 
ECLfinder 0.65 0.59 0.62 
SIIMCO 0.61 0.52 0.56 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.49 0.44 0.46 
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Table 8: The quality of the results predicted by each system computed by comparing 
the system’s top-ranked nodes with the corresponding ones predicted by the 
network metrics using the Krebs’s 9/11 dataset [50, 51].  












y  0.77 0.64 0.70 
ECLfinder 0.66 0.61 0.63 
SIIMCO 0.62 0.55 0.58 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.54 0.58 0.56 












0.68 0.73 0.70 
ECLfinder 0.59 0.57 0.58 
SIIMCO 0.55 0.50 0.52 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.49 0.43 0.46 












y  0.62 0.53 0.57 
ECLfinder 0.66 0.68 0.67 
SIIMCO 0.64 0.59 0.61 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.52 0.46 0.49 













y  0.73 0.66 0.69 
ECLfinder 0.71 0.67 0.69 
SIIMCO 0.69 0.55 0.61 
CrimeNet Explorer 0.57 0.51 0.54 
LogAnalysis 0.66 0.61 0.63 
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Fig. 5: The overall average Recall, Precision, and F-value of the five systems. 
         We computed the overall average execution time of IICCC 
and the other four methods for identifying the influential nodes in 
the thee ground-truth datasets described in section VII-A. Fig. 6 
shows the results. As the figure shows, the computation time of 
IICCC is acceptable, and it is outperformed by only five methods. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Overall average execution time for identifying the influential nodes in the 
three ground-truth datasets described in section VII-A 
C. Evaluating the Accuracy of Detecting Critical Communication 
Channels 
We compared IICCC with the technique proposed in [40] for 
identifying the important communication paths (e.g., the critical 
communication channels) in the Caviar dataset [6, 31]. The authors 
of [40] proposed a framework for identifying the important edges 
originating from influential nodes in a graph. To the best of our 
knowledge, the technique proposed in [40] is the closest to our 
work for identifying the important paths originating from the 
influential nodes in a network. ECLfinder, SIIMCO, CrimeNet, 
and LogAnalysis are not designed for identifying important paths. 
[40] employs locality sensitive hashing techniques for identifying 
important edges. We refer to this technique by LSH (Locality 
Sensitive Hashing) for easy reference. [40] used the LSH technique 
for computing energy-efficient by applying energy-efficient for 
low importance edges and full fidelity for high importance edges.  
        We used the Caviar dataset [6, 31] described in section VII-A 
for the evaluation. The most influential nodes in the Caviar dataset 
have been designated by nodes N1, N12, and N3 [10]. The gang 
member represented by node N1 was heading the hashish drug 
trafficking. The gang member represented by node N12 was 
heading the cocaine drug trafficking. The gang member 
representing by node N3 was the intermediary between the N1 and 
N12 as well as between the two and non-traffickers [10]. Therefore, 
we considered the paths originating from nodes N1, N12, and N3 
as ground-truth critical communication channels.  
       We used the detection accuracy (Acc) formula shown in 
Equation 6 as a metric for the evaluation. Fig. 7 shows the results. 
 
                                       𝐴𝑐𝑐 = 	 %&'%(%&'%(')&')(     (6) 
• TP (True positive): Number of paths 
correctly predicted as non-critical. 
• FP (False positive):  Number of paths 
incorrectly predicted as non-critical.  
• TN (True negative): Number of paths 
correctly predicted as critical 
• FN (False negative): Number of paths 
incorrectly predicted as critical. 
 
  
                                       IICCC                                                   LSH          
 
Fig. 7: The detection accuracy of IICCC and LSH [40] for identifying the critical 
communication channels in the Caviar dataset [6, 31]. 
D. Comparing the Systems in terms of Euclidean Distances  
In this test we aim at measuring the degree of conformation 
between the predictions made by IICCC and the corresponding 
predictions made by the standard network metrics. That is, we 
evaluated the accuracy of IICCC in terms of the distances between: 
(1) the position of each node m in a list ranked by IICCC according 
to the influences of nodes in the network, and (2) the position of 
the same node m in a list ranked by a standard network metric 
according to the influences of nodes in the network. A ranking of 
nodes is a permutation of the integers 1, 2, .... Intuitively, the 
smaller the distance the better IICCC. Especially, we are interested 
in measuring the distances between the positions of IICCC’s top-
ranked nodes and the positions of the same nodes in the lists ranked 
by the standard network metrics. Towards this, we computed the 
average Euclidean distances between the positions of the top n 
nodes in the lists ranked by IICCC, and the corresponding positions 
of the same nodes in the lists ranked by the three-network metrics, 
where n is considered to be 5, 10, or 15. We employed the 
Euclidean measure shown in Equation 7. Fig. 8 plots the average 
Euclidean distance for each system using the three datasets 
described in subsection VII-A. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
                                                   (7)         
 
where  is the list of the top  nodes predicted by network 
metric ,  is the list of the ranked top  nodes 
predicted by network metric , is the list of the 
ranked top  nodes predicted by a system , and  and  
 are the positions in the lists  and of node .  
 
  
           IICCC                                        ECLfinder                                  SIIMCO  
           CrimeNet Explorer                     LogAnalysis                         
 
Fig. 8: The average Euclidean distance for each system using the three datasets 
described in subsection VII-A. 
 
E. Discussion of the Results  
          As shown in Fig. 7 that IICCC outperformed LSH [40] in 
terms of Detection Accuracy of the critical communication 
channels in the Caviar dataset [6, 31]. Based on our observation of 
the experimental results, we attribute this outperformance to the 
combination of the “significant communication paths” and “critical 
communication channels” concepts employed by IICCC. The 
important paths identified by the “locality sensitive hashing 
technique” employed by [40] is equivalent to the “significant 
communication paths” identified by IICCC. However, the 
performance of IICCC over [40] stems from IICCC’s employment 
of the “critical communication channels” concept, which shorts list 
the “significant communication paths” based on their importance 
in networks. 
          As Tables 6-8 and Figs. 5 and 8 show, IICCC outperformed 
SIIMCO, ECLfinder, CrimeNet Explorer, and LogAnalysis for 
identifying the influential nodes in the datasets. After studying the 
experimental results, we attributed the superior performance of 
IICCC to the following factors: 
a) IICCC returned eight Enron employees as the most 
influential ones in the organization. Five out of these 
eight employees are publicly known to be the most 
involved ones in the crime, according to the investigation 
and the sentencing records that have been released to 
public domain. They were charged and found guilty of 
various conspiracy and accounting frauds. These five 
employees are: Arthur Andersen (auditor), Andrew 
Fastow (financial officer), Kenneth Lay (CEO), Rick 
Causey (Chief Accounting Officer), and Jeffrey Skilling 
(COO). On the other hand, ECLfinder and SIIMCO 
identified correctly four of them, LogAnalysis identified 
correctly three of them, and CrimeNet Explorer 
identified correctly only one of them. 
b) IICCC determined the influence of each node in the 
evaluation networks by considering not only the node’s 
number of links, but also the relative influences of the 
nodes connected to the node (using the concept of 
significant communication paths). IICCC also 
considered the relative influences of the edges connected 
to the node (using the concept of critical communication 
channels). 
c) CrimeNet Explorer assigned a weight for each node 
based on its topology in the evaluation networks with 
regard to the node n under consideration. Therefore, 
these nodes did not contribute equally to the influence of 
n, a phenomenon described as incomplete contribution. 
This is one of the key limitations of CrimeNet Explorer. 
d) When identifying the influences of the nodes in the 
evaluation networks, LogAnalysis considered only the 
weights of the edges connected to these nodes. This is 
one of the key limitations of LogAnalysis. 
e) SIIMCO and generated a much larger number of 
correctly predicted influences of nodes in the parts of the 
evaluation networks that have less dense connections. 
That is, they did not perform as well in dense parts. This 
is one of the key limitations of SIIMCO and ECLfinder. 
Comparing IICCC with the real-world drug trafficking operation 
that identified the Caviar Canadian gang [6, 31] can give a 
supporting evidence of the possibility of applying the IICCC 
method to solve real-world practical problems. The similarities 
between IICCC and the Caviar operation can be summarized as 
follows: 
• The Caviar operation constructed the network that depicts 
the drug traffickers based on the phone calls exchanged 
between them. Similarly, IICCC constructs a network 
depicting a criminal organization based on the phone calls 
exchanged between the criminals in the organization. 
• The Caviar operation identified the influential criminals 
in the network (i.e., the criminals represented by nodes 
N1, N12, and N3) in order to monitor them and to gain 
insight into the traffickers’ work. Similarly, IICCC 
identifies the influential criminals in a criminal 
organization in order to monitor them and to short-list the 
important communication channels originating from 
them. This monitoring can give an insight into the 
organization’s work and the identity of a large number of 
the insiders and outsiders who deal with the organization. 
This will eventually lead to the arrest of these people, 
which will most likely result in at least crippling the 
organization’s work. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Many techniques have been proposed to determine the relative 
importance of nodes. However, most these techniques do not 
generate useful short-lists of critical communication channels in a 
criminal organization. We have developed a forensics system 
called IICCC that can (1) infer the top influential criminals in a 
criminal organization, and (2) short-list the vital communication 
channels in the criminal organization. IICCC can create a network 
from either MCD or crime incident reports. IICCC employs the 
following concepts: (1) “significant communication paths”, 
denoting sequences of influential criminals who propagate 
information diffused by the criminal under investigation to other 
criminals, and (2) “critical communication channels”, which are 
sub-paths linking two adjacent influential criminals in the network 
and passing vital information from the top influential criminals to 
others lower in the hierarchy. IICCC identifies the influential 
criminals and significant communication paths by computing the 
χ2 value of each node in a significant communication path.  
          We compared IICCC experimentally with LSH [40], 
SIIMCO [45], ECLfinder [41], CrimeNet Explorer [21], and 
LogAnalysis [13]. For the evaluations, we used the following 
datasets: Caviar dataset [6, 31], Enron email dataset [12, 24], and 
Krebs’s 9/11 dataset [50, 51]. The experimental results showed that 
IICCC has a superior prediction performance. 
          The key contribution of the paper lies in identifying the vital 
communication channels in a criminal network. That is, the key 
contribution of IICCC is to generate useful short-lists of the critical 
communication channels in a criminal organization. This is 
because there are numerous communication channels in criminal 
networks, and investigating all the channels is time-consuming and 
distracting, when the investigators would prefer to focus on the key 
channels that reveal the most information.  
         The experimental results confirmed the usefulness of 
shortlisting critical communication channels. For example, in the 
Caviar dataset used in our experiments there are 86, 138, and 227 
communication channels connected directly and indirectly to the 
most influential nodes designated by nodes N1, N12, and N3 
respectively. Out of these channels, IICCC identified only 9, 5, and 
14 as critical communication channels connected to N1, N12, and 
N3 respectively. 
        Even though the paper focusses on identifying the important 
communications paths in criminal networks, the framework of 
IICCC can also be used to solve many other practical real-world 
problems depicted in the form of networks, such as the following: 
Ø In social networks, it can be used for detecting 
communities. A number of studies successfully identified 
the boundaries of communities based on the strength of 
the information flow in the paths/edges connecting their 
nodes [43]. 
Ø In metabolic networks, it can be used for identifying 
functionally-related units. A fully described path between 
two units represents the dynamics and dependencies 
among them [46]. 
Ø In energy conservation computation, it can be used for 
identifying energy-efficient paths. A path in an energy 
network that passes energy with high flow rate is likely to 
utilize energy effectively [38]. 
Ø In health care, it can be used for quantifying the impact of 
human mobility in spreading infectious diseases [53] 
(e.g., an influential path depicts a route with high human 
mobility). 
Ø In urban planning, it can be used for identifying congested 
roads [53] (e.g., an influential path depicts a congested 
road).          
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